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Introduction
Just over a century ago, in 1892, L. R.
Dicksee in the first edition of his book,
Auditing, indicated the lack of agreement
among accountants as to the precise nature of
their responsibilities for auditing company
accounts due in part to the paucity of legal
decisions in cases involving auditors. Within
a short space of t i m e , the question of
auditors' responsibilities appeared to have
been answered in two decisions handed
down by the Court of Appeal: In re The
London and General Bank (Acct. L. R. 1895,
173; henceforth L&G) and In re The Kingston
Cotton Mill Co. (Acct. L. R. 1896, 77;
henceforth KCM). These two cases were
quickly established in the professional
l i t e r a t u r e and case law and today are
frequently cited in arguments before the
courts, e.g. in Galoo v. Bright Grahame
Murray, (WLR 1994, 1360). Although the
two Victorian cases share many similarities,
they have opposite outcomes: in L&G the
auditors were held liable for dividends
improperly paid, whereas in KCM, the
auditors escaped liability.
The similarities of the cases are:
• The actions were brought by the Official
Receiver alleging misfeasance under the
Companies (Winding Up) Act 1890.
• Both began with a substantial claim
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against the auditors-£400,000 in L&G
and £80,000 in KCM, though these were
reduced d u r i n g the course of the
litigation.
The auditors were Chartered Accountants,
professional men, not as in the earlier case
of Leads Estate, Building and Investment
Co. (1887 Ch. D . , 36, 787) which
involved an unskilled amateur.
Both were heard in the first instance
before Mr. Justice Vaughan Williams.
Two of the appellate judges were the same
in each case, Lindley, L. J. and Lopes, L. J.,
(with Rigby L. in L&G, and Kay, L. in
KCM).
Both auditors appeared to have placed too
much reliance on m a n a g e m e n t ' s
judgement regarding the values of assets,
customer accounts in the case of L&G and
stock and fixed assets in the case of KCM.

Brief reviews
L&G was closely connected with the
Balfour group of companies—in fact it was
established that the sole purpose of the bank
was to support other group companies. The
bank's profits were inflated over the course of
several years by the inclusion as income of
interest on loans which was never received.
KCM was a cotton spinning company
whose profits had been overstated through
continued on page 22
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the deliberate manipulations of the stock
figure by the Managing Director. The value
of fixed assets had also been overstated since
no allowance had been made for depreciation.
The reliance on management is evident
in both cases. In the L&G case, the auditors
including Theobald, a chartered accountant,
had been alarmed at the condition of some of
the bank's debtors' accounts. They had made
a special report to the directors
recommending that given the conditions no
dividend should be paid. They also proposed
to warn the shareholders of this report. They
were persuaded mainly by Balfour to change
this report on his assurance that he would
report: to the shareholders at the general
meeting. They sought to cover themselves
by inserting in their report to shareholders a
rather cryptic comment that the "value of
the assets was dependent on realisation."
Balfour did not honour his alleged promise
to inform the shareholders d u r i n g the
general meeting, at which the auditors were
present but did nothing.
The position of the KCM auditors,
Peasegood and Pickering, is quite different.
They knew nothing. They were not even
remotely suspicious of the stock
manipulations although the stock figure had
increased substantially and the gross profit
percentage had increased dramatically in a
short space of time. The auditors simply
accepted the values of stock as computed by
the m a n a g i n g director. A l t h o u g h they
claimed to have tested the "casts" of the
stock sheets and summaries, they could
provide no proof of this. In their defense,
they argued that stock was a technical area
beyond the expertise which could reasonably
be expected of auditors, and therefore, they
were e n t i t l e d to rely on management's
certificate of the stock figure.
How then is one to reconcile these
contradictory decisions? From a legal point
of view, the only apparent explanation lies
in the degree of honesty in reporting the
audit findings. In L&G the auditors had

performed what appears to be an adequate
audit, at least in terms of discovering the
true state of the bank's customers' accounts.
But they failed to make a full report to the
shareholders. In K C M , the a u d i t o r s
appeared to have performed a perfunctory
audit, at least in regard to stock, but they
reported honestly. Herein lies the anomaly
of the two decisions: a thorough audit may
produce results which should be
communicated to shareholders, and the
auditor will be liable if he does not give an
honest report; an auditor who performs a
mechanical audit is less likely to unearth
conditions of which shareholders deserve to
be made aware, and therefore, there is less
chance of being subjected to management
pressure. An auditor in these circumstances
will find it easier to produce an "honest"
report.
The nature of the accounting errors
provides no p l a u s i b l e reason for t h e
different j u d g e m e n t s . The a r g u m e n t s
before the court concerning the technical
nature of stock in a manufacturing company
could have been made in the context of the
banking case where it is undoubtedly a
skilled job to assess the c r e d i t risk of
different types of business, the solvency of
c u s t o m e r s , and the value of securities
p r o v i d e d (as a c k n o w l e d g e d by a
contemporary writer in The Juridical Review,
1901, p. 104). The auditors of L&G tackled
these technicalities and ascertained the true
position, whereas the auditors of KCM
simply relied on management. Although
other sources of evidence were available, for
example, a Stock Journal which if analyzed
would have shown the discrepancy in the
physical volumes of book stock and reported
stock. In a d d i t i o n it is clear from
contributions to The Accountant that some
of its readers thought that there were other
warning signs which should have put the
a u d i t o r upon enquiry. The significant
change in gross profit percentage and the
stock turnover ratio seemed to be matters
which the auditor should have investigated.
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Although valid reasons for these observed
changes could have been advanced, there is
no indication that the auditor called for any
explanations.
An alternative explanation may be the
question of public policy. Did the Balfour
connection condemn the auditor in L&G?
The collapse of the Balfour group sent
ripples through the city and concern among
investing classes. KCM was not nearly so
large an enterprise, and there may have been
less pressure on the judiciary to pander to
public sentiment. However, it is difficult to
prove or disprove this possibility.

L&G it was said that the auditors should go
beyond the books of account, which they did;
they examined securities for the bank's loans.
But in KCM it seemed sufficient to rely on a
certificate from management; no further
checks were performed and no analytical
procedures were employed in order to get
audit evidence. It is hard to rationalize the
different stances of the same court. Was it
that the court sought to punish the auditor
who knew more than he reported and to be
lenient to the auditor who reported honestly
albeit on an inadequate job or were there
policy factors involved?

Conclusion
These two cases did not really help the
profession in its a t t e m p t s to clarify its
responsibilities. However, some of the dicta
have withstood the test of time. The lesson
from L&G is that auditors should report
honestly—a point which was readily taken on
board in the literature although doubt exists
even now as to whether auditors have
sufficient independence to go against
management and to make an honest report.
In terms of the extent of audit fieldwork,
the signals from the cases are less clear. In

The reaction of practitioners to the
cases, so far as may be judged from
correspondence reproduced in The Accountant,
was that the KCM auditor was deserving of
less sympathy from his peers, though this
was m i n g l e d with some relief for the
protection which the decision appeared to
give auditors. On the other hand the L&G
decision was viewed by some as harsh. The
uncertain outcome of l i t i g a t i o n was to
continue throughout the present century and
is one factor in the reluctance of auditors and
their insurers to pursue legal action
preferring instead to settle out-of-court.

MONOGRAPHS AVAILABLE
The Academy of Accounting Historians announces the publication of Monograph
No. 7 of its Monograph Series, Wolodymyr Motyka's Bibliography of Russian Language
Publications on Accounting 1736-1917, Vol. 1 (1736-1900) and Vol. 2 (1901-1917). There
is a critical introduction contained in each volume which indexes works on accounting
published in Tsarist Russia chronologically, thematically, and by author. The set also
contains a glossary and list of sources of main listings. The monograph is published by
Garland Publishing and priced at $132.00.
The Academy also has copies of Monograph No. 6, published in 1991 to honor Dr.
Paul Garner. The monograph, entitled, The Costing Heritage: Studies in Honor of S. Paul
Garner, is edited by O. Finley Graves of The University of Mississippi. The monograph
is priced at $15 for individual members and $20 for institutional affiliates. Orders and
inquiries for Monograph No. 6 should be made to: Doris M. Cook, The Academy of
Accounting Historians, Department of Accounting, University of Arkansas, Fayetteville,
Arkansas, 72701, USA.
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